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Decentralization in Indonesia was introduced institutionally in 2001, with a democrati-
zation drive promoted by international donors and by the intention of the new govern-
ment to clear away the centralistic image of Soeharto. Decentralization has had some
effects on regional economies and on local government administration. Compared to the
period before decentralization, the share of GRDP and local government finance has
increased in Java, though investment and bank borrowing have expanded to the outer
islands. In qualitative aspects, decentralization has transferred not only administrative
authority but also many new vested interests from the center to regions. Local govern-
ments have become more extensive economic actors in regional economies. Regional
economic actors now compete actively for such vested interests and have missed the
opportunity to create market-friendly regional economies. The government sector should
not be a mere rent-seeking economic actor, but should play a role as a facilitator promot-
ing private sector activities in regional economies.
INTRODUCTION
AS a general rule, the purpose of decentralization, and of fiscal decentraliza-tion in particular, is to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation in line
with fiscal federalism. Resource allocation is one of the three economic
roles (along with income distribution and economic stabilization) of the public sec-
tor (Matsui 2003). The idea of decentralization is that local governments, which are
familiar with the particular circumstances in regions, are better positioned to pro-
vide public goods and services locally than the central government, which tends to
come up with uniform responses across the country. As a matter of course, it is also
preferable to place in the hands of local governments the planning and implementa-
tion of development policies that reflect actual conditions in particular regions. If
local governments take the initiative, armed with powers transferred from the cen-
tral government, a grand design can be drawn for a more efficient allocation of
resources and development of regional economies, and of the national economy as
well.
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Decentralization in Indonesia was essentially brought in from the outside in or-
der to facilitate the process of democratization in the wake of the collapse of the
Soeharto regime in May 1998. In the introduction of decentralization, an important
role was played by foreign aid agencies, including the World Bank, the U.N. Devel-
opment Program (UNDP), Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). These orga-
nizations regarded decentralization as part of the democratization process, and sup-
ported the introduction and firm establishment of decentralization in a variety of
ways, including the development of laws and regulations and the training of local
administration officials.
Meanwhile, local governments, who had pent-up frustration with the central gov-
ernment, saw a golden opportunity to expand their bargaining power with the cen-
tral government in the demise of the Soeharto regime, which had maintained a
centralized system for 32 years. Furthermore, Soeharto’s successor, President B. J.
Habibie, who was called a “protégé of Soeharto,” was looking for an effective means
of ridding himself of the shadow of his predecessor, and at the same time saw it
necessary to send a strong message to the regions outside of Java, his political
bastion (and particularly to the eastern parts of Indonesia). Thus, there were domes-
tic incentives and reasons for the positive acceptance of decentralization in Indone-
sia, making its introduction relatively smooth and without resistance.
However, the Indonesians accepted decentralization in a manner quite different
from the democratization process hoped for by foreign aid organizations. With the
transfer to local governments of administrative powers and funds that had so far
been controlled by the central government, opportunities for gaining interests and
rent also were transferred to regions, touching off an uninhibited race for them
without central control at various levels in regions.
Local governments have a crucial role to play as actors promoting decentraliza-
tion and also leading decentralization for regional economic development. The afore-
mentioned design of fiscal federalism can be realized only when the assumption
can be made that local governments have sufficient capability to develop and imple-
ment effective policies for regional economic development using powers taken over
from the central government. In other words, the capacity of local governments as
providers of public goods and services to local residents is of crucial importance.
While local governments under the centralized system must have the capability to
devotedly perform what they have been instructed to do by the central government,
decentralization calls upon local governments to demonstrate the capacity to pre-
cisely and deftly provide necessary administrative services at their own initiative.
In Indonesia, which steered away from centralized control to decentralization,
the government as well as foreign aid organizations were well aware that it would
take time to build the capacity of local governments—a fundamental prerequisite
for decentralization—and recognized the possibility of various problems arising.
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However, the Habibie government and foreign aid agencies shared the desire to put
decentralization in place quickly before the momentum for post-Soeharto “reform”
(reformasi) faded away. They apparently decided to go ahead with decentralization
and to solidify it by trial and error, while responding gradually to a variety of antici-
pated problems through such measures as the training of local government officials.
Bearing in mind the background described above, this article examines the im-
pact of decentralization, as an institution introduced from outside, on the structure
of regional economies, focusing on the following two points. The first is the capac-
ity of local governments, which is a prerequisite for the promotion of decentraliza-
tion under fiscal federalism. There is a need to consider conditions that would en-
able local governments, accustomed as they are to centralized administrative and
fiscal management, to efficiently provide public goods and services locally as ex-
pected under fiscal federalism. The second point is the position of local govern-
ments and the private sector as players and actors in regional economies. The gov-
ernment sector has long been considered the principal player in regional development
in Indonesia. This article attempts to examine if that perception has changed in
economic activities following the introduction of decentralization, and if it has,
how the changes have affected regional economies.
Before moving to the main subject, a series of recent articles discussing Indonesia’s
regional economies in relation to decentralization are outlined below. The problem
of the excessive issuance of local ordinances (peraturan daerah: perda) by local
governments wishing to increase fiscal revenues in the post-decentralization era
was already addressed by the World Bank (2003) and Matsui (2003). An array of
newly created local taxes, local levies, and third-party donations have been struc-
turally built into regional economies as important sources of revenue for regional
economic actors seeking new rent. Casson and Obidzinski (2002) point out that
decentralization has created an environment that supports illegal logging in forests
and illegal trade in lumber, and argue that in practice it would be extremely difficult
to ban illegal logging, as it has been virtually legalized and is contributing to in-
creasing revenues for local governments. Marks (2002) cites sandalwood in East
Nusa Tenggara Province as a case of resource depletion caused by decentralization,
and notes the adverse impact of rent seeking by the provincial government and the
armed forces. Shidiq (2003) points to the emergence of clientelist organizations
seeking new rent in the wake of the shift of funds to regions in decentralization, and
argues that the rising social cost of establishing these organizations is bringing
feuds among local elites to the fore.
However, there has been no research so far on the relation between decentraliza-
tion and regional economies in Indonesia. On the other hand, the introduction of
decentralization took place fairly recently, and some more time will be required for
rigorous analysis. This article attempts to examine changes in regional economies
around the time of the introduction of decentralization from both quantitative and
174 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
qualitative aspects, and present problems that need to be addressed by the new
central government to be inaugurated after general elections in 2004.
I. QUANTITATIVE CHANGES IN REGIONAL ECONOMIES AROUND
THE BEGINNING OF DECENTRALIZATION
Heretofore, Indonesia’s regional economies have often been characterized, as in
Hill (1998, pp. 21–23), by the inequitable distribution of economic activities, in-
come gaps between regions, inequality in social indicators, the huge differences in
industrial structures between Java and the outer islands, and so on. What changes
have the structures of regional economies undergone since the enactment in 1999
of Act No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Act No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Bal-
ance between the Center and the Regions? This will be examined below, dividing
the ensuing time into three periods: the period before the financial crisis (1993–97),
the period of the financial crisis (1997–99) and the period for the preparation and
implementation of decentralization (1999–).
In the years before the financial crisis, solid economic growth was registered for
all regions (Table I). During the crisis, however, economic growth rates turned nega-
tive except for Kalimantan, with Java being hit by the steepest decline. Growth
generally recovered in the period of preparation and implementation of decentrali-
zation, but it only returned to the levels of around 1997, before the onslaught of the
financial crisis.
TABLE  I
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE AND INVESTMENT APPROVALS BY REGION
(%)
Indonesia Java, Bali Sumatra Kalimantan Sulawesi Others
Average annual growth:
1993–97 7.2 7.4 6.0 7.5 7.2 9.1
1997–99 −5.2 −7.5 −2.9 0.3 −0.6 −0.7
1999–2002 4.6 5.1 3.5 3.9 5.0 5.3
Domestic investment approvals:
1993–97 100.0 56.9 21.8 12.6 4.1 4.6
1997–99 100.0 45.8 25.2 13.3 8.0 7.7
1999–2002 100.0 32.4 29.3 7.1 25.0 6.3
Foreign investment approvals:
1993–97 100.0 64.7 20.5 5.6 5.1 4.1
1997–99 100.0 59.4 34.7 3.4 1.3 1.1
1999–2002 100.0 48.3 29.5 5.6 1.3 15.3
Sources: Data from BPS, Gross Regional Domestic Product of Provinces in Indonesia by
Industrial Origin (Jakarta: BPS, various years); Investment Coordination Board, http://www
.bkpm.go.id.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Looking at regional economies in Indonesia, the overconcentration of economic
activities in Java, particularly Jakarta, has often been noted previously. Looking at
gross regional domestic product (GRDP) data (in nominal prices), the ratio of Jakarta
to total GRDP rose from 15.8% in 1993 to 16.4% in 1997 and 16.6% in 2002, while
Java’s ratio also increased from 59.1% in 1993 to 60.1% and 60.3%, respectively,
in 1997 and 2002. The gaps between Jakarta and Java, and other regions has shown
a widening tendency since the implementation of decentralization in 2001, with
changes in the coefficient of variation for gaps among provinces in per-capita GRDP
supporting this tendency (Table II).
Investment, both domestic and foreign, has been on a remarkable decline after
peaking in the mid-1990s. Since the financial crisis, however, while investment
approvals increased on a relative basis in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and other prov-
inces, the ratio of investment approvals in Java has been falling (Table I). Invest-
ment approvals kept dropping until 2002, but then showed signs of picking in 2003,
with approvals of domestic and foreign investment soaring over the preceding year
by 93.3% (to Rp 48,764.7 billion) and 49.7% (to US$1,466.84 million), respec-
tively.
On the financial side, the ratio of Jakarta to total fiscal revenues of local govern-
ments (summing the figures for governments of provinces [propinsi] and regencies
[kabupaten] / municipalities [kota]) fell to 10.0% in FY1999 from 11.6% in FY1993,
but rose again to 11.1% in FY2002 following decentralization. The ratio of Java,
including Jakarta, also rose sharply following decentralization. The concentration
of fiscal funds in Java is due to an increase in the general allocation funds (dana
alokasi umum: DAU) from the central government, which largely reflects the size
of population. After the period of preparation and implementation of decentraliza-
TABLE  II
REGIONAL GAPS BY PER-CAPITA GRDP AND PER-CAPITA REVENUE BY PROVINCE
1995 2000 2002
Growth Rate (%)
1995–2000 2000–2002
Per capita GRDP (Rp 1,000) 1,934.0 1,978.9 2,079.8 0.46 2.52
(Coefficient of variation) (0.714) (0.860) (0.867)
Per capita revenue by
province (Rp 1,000) 114.9 221.3 632.9 14.00 69.13
(Coefficient of variation) (0.478) (0.515) (0.729)
Sources: Data from BPS, Financial Statistics of Provincial Government (Jakarta: BPS, vari-
ous years); BPS, Financial Statistics of Regency/Municipality Government (Jakarta: BPS, vari-
ous years).
Note: Per capita revenue by province is obtained by dividing the sum of provincial govern-
ment revenue and regency/municipality government revenue by the population in the relevant
year.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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tion, and particularly after 2001, all local governments enlarged their budgets, and
the introduction of revenue sharing (bagi hasil) led to an expansion of the imbal-
ance in budget scale between resources-rich and other provinces. Though the DAU
were designed to mitigate this imbalance, they have not fully performed their role
in closing the growing gaps in regional fiscal revenues caused by the revenue-shar-
ing arrangement. This failure is due to a tacit understanding, regarding the shift of
funds from the central to local governments, that the amount of DAU a local gov-
ernment receives shall not fall short of the amount provided in the preceding fiscal
year. In fact, the gaps in per-capita revenue by province in terms of the coefficient
of variation have been rising since decentralization (Table II). In local finance, the
ratio of revenues from self-funding sources to total revenue has increased for prov-
inces with stable sources of tax revenue such as the automobile tax, but has de-
clined for regencies and municipalities, despite increases in absolute amounts, ow-
ing to the transfer of massive funds from the central government.
What about the flow of funds? Looking at balances of bank lending and deposits
at the time of the introduction of decentralization, we see that the balance of lend-
ing topped that of deposits before the financial crisis, but that deposits exceeded
lending after the crisis (Table III). Before the financial crisis, Java had the high rate
TABLE  III
COMPOSITION RATIO OF LENDING AND DEPOSIT BALANCES BY REGION
(%)
1993 1997 1999 2003
Loan:
Sumatra 9.7 7.8 9.9 13.5
Java, Bali 83.5 86.7 82.7 75.0
Kalimantan 2.7 2.1 2.6 4.3
Sulawesi 1.8 1.6 2.5 3.9
Eastern Islands 2.3 1.4 2.2 3.2
Deposit:
Sumatra 8.5 7.3 8.9 10.8
Java, Bali 84.5 86.6 83.8 80.1
Kalimantan 2.6 2.2 2.6 3.4
Sulawesi 2.0 1.7 2.1 2.4
Eastern Islands 2.4 2.2 2.7  3.2
Loan/deposit:
Sumatra 119.7 113.0 40.2 61.4
Java, Bali 104.1 105.9 35.5 46.1
Kalimantan 112.5 100.1 36.2 62.0
Sulawesi 95.4 100.1 43.5 79.5
Eastern Islands 99.4 88.1 29.7 49.9
Total 105.4 136.4 36.0 49.2
Source: Bank of Indonesia (various years).
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of increase in both lending and deposits, but regions other than Java began to show
higher rates of increase in both areas after the crisis. Even during the period of the
preparation and implementation of decentralization, Java was the sole region with a
low rate of increase. As a consequence, while the deposit-to-loan rate remained just
46.1% in Java in 2003, it recovered to 60–80% in Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Kalimantan.
Java’s composition ratio declined for both lending and deposits, particularly af-
ter decentralization. For lending, its composition ratio fell from 82.7% in 1999 to
75.0% in November 2003. The decline was far steeper for Jakarta (from 60.7% to
38.1%). For deposits, Java’s ratio similarly dropped from 83.8% to 80.1% (and
from 59.8% to 54.4% for Jakarta). From around the period of preparation for de-
TABLE  IV
COMPOSITION RATIO OF LENDING AND DEPOSITS BY ACTOR
A. Lending Composition Ratio by Borrower (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Government sector 7.4 4.5 5.0 5.1 4.4
Central government 7.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 3.8
Local government 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
Province 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Regency/municipality 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Local govt enterprise (BUMD) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
Private sector 92.6 95.5 95.0 94.9 95.6
Private 71.1 69.5 64.0 59.4 56.0
Rural banks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Individuals 21.5 26.0 31.0 35.4 39.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. Deposit Composition Ratio by Depositor (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Non Resident 5.9 10.5 2.5 5.7 1.8
Government sector 23.1 28.2 33.8 31.2 35.5
Central government 18.0 24.6 26.0 22.5 23.4
Local government 5.1 3.6 7.8 8.7 12.1
Province 0.0 2.0 2.7 3.2 4.2
Regency/municipality 0.0 1.5 5.0 5.4 7.6
Local govt enterprise (BUMD) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Private sector 71.0 61.3 63.7 63.2 62.7
Private 42.8 38.9 38.1 36.9 36.3
Rural banks 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Individuals 28.2 22.4 25.5 26.0 26.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Indonesia (various years).
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centralization, bank financing began to spread to other regions, reducing the
overconcentration in Java. Meanwhile, the ratio of lending to the private sector to
total lending increased from 92.6% to 95.6% in November 2003, and the ratio of
deposits by the private sector to total deposits declined from 71.0% in 1999 to
62.7% in November 2003 (Table IV). Deposits increased for the government sector
in recent years, particularly for regency/municipality governments, which is quite
noteworthy as a post-decentralization change. This indicates that funds deposited
by the government sector are increasingly being funneled to the private sector as
loans. However, among the private sector borrowers, lending increased mainly to
individuals, which is consistent with increases in lending in the area of consumer
finance.
As seen above, there has been a definite change in the relative importance of Java
among regional economies since the time of decentralization. While its ratio in-
creased in GRDP and fiscal revenues, its weight declined in investment, bank lend-
ing, and deposits. While the gap between Java and other regions widened in terms
of fiscal funds and economic activities, bank funds and business opportunities are
beginning to spread to regions other than Java in relative terms, generating two
seemingly contradictory phenomena. Given the lethargy in manufacturing and the
rising weight of the commercial and services sectors, stagnant investment, and the
rising ratio of consumer finance in bank lending, it appears that most of the funds
that flowed into the regions went into consumption and broadly defined services
industries, and have not contributed to a recovery in agricultural or manufacturing
operations. Although decentralization facilitated the flow of funds into the local
government sector, these funds have tended to finance government consumption or
to go to banks as deposits, instead of financing public investment. Banks also have
yet to accelerate their lending for investment purposes or for operating capital. The
inflow of funds into the regions under decentralization has not served as a driving
force for regional economic development.
II. QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN REGIONAL ECONOMIES
AT THE TIME OF DECENTRALIZATION
As described above, though some quantitative changes have taken place, there have
been no explicit qualitative changes in the structures of regional economies follow-
ing decentralization. It is clear that with the transfer of power and massive amounts
of funds from the central to local governments, opportunities emerged in the re-
gions to gain a variety of interests and rents. But these changes mainly boosted
consumption, rather than production and investment activities in the regions. Local
governments seized upon decentralization as an opportunity to step forward as eco-
nomic actors, seeking access to state assets in the regions, the transfer of control
over airport and port functions to local governments, fund raising through means
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such as local bonds, and, in some resource-rich provinces, the planning and imple-
mentation of ambitious projects. Though funds are beginning to flow to the re-
gional government enterprises (Badan Usaha Milik Daerah: BUMD) and regional
development banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah: BPD), these bodies have not yet
become viable agents for regional development under a medium- and long-term
perspective, as it is difficult to remove intervention by local governments in man-
agement and they are not entirely healthy financially. While some signs of the emer-
gence of new private sector business can be seen, in areas such as real estate devel-
opment around regional cities, the impact of such businesses on the real economy is
still limited. The real problem is a possible loss of healthy competition that began to
surface after the financial crisis because of the emergence of opportunities to ac-
quire rents from decentralization.
A. Proliferation of Local Ordinances and High-Cost Economies
What is most often cited as the negative impact of decentralization is the in-
creased issuance of local ordinances by local governments. Since the introduction
of decentralization, an average of more than 30 local ordinances has been enacted
per year by each local assembly. Many of these ordinances are designed to increase
the local governments’ own sources of revenues, such as local taxes (pajak daerah),
local levies (retribusi daerah), and third-party donations (sumbangan pihak ketiga).
While there are limitations on local taxes and local levies under Act No. 34/2000, it
is difficult to reverse such levies at the local level when local governments go through
proper procedures to introduce them under local ordinances approved by local as-
semblies. These local taxes and other levies have often been criticized for hamper-
ing the revitalization of regional economic activities and creating high-cost eco-
nomic structures (Regional Autonomy Watch [KPPOD] 2003; World Bank 2003).
According to KPPOD, in a questionnaire survey on a total of 5,140 companies,
85% of respondents replied that 2–10% of their production costs were expenses to
provide services to local government bureaucrats (Kompas, January 21, 2004).
However, were regional economies before decentralization really efficient, and
did the introduction of decentralization actually make them costly? In the regional
economies, economic actors were not guaranteed fair market competition. Rather,
a handful of specified actors undertook economic activities by obtaining a variety
of privileges from local governments. On the surface, local governments painted
private large companies as evil, and intervened in their activities in various ways
under the pretext of programs for the protection and guidance of residents for the
relief of the weak. In doing so, they collected various ill-defined service charges
(pungutan) from companies other than those with cozy ties with local governments.
In other words, the problem with local taxes and levies, which are often regarded as
negative products of decentralization, simply brought into the open in a system-
atized manner what had been practiced all along in a black box.
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“Service fees” for local government bureaucrats indeed existed during the Soeharto
era. When did calculate costs, companies took these fees into account beforehand.
The real problem is not whether the proportion of 2–10% of cost, as cited by KPPOD,
is large or not, but rather the fact that with the lack of limits on the service fees
demanded by local government bureaucrats, security allowances requested by mili-
tary/police, and the frequency of such demands, companies are finding it difficult to
make cost calculations.
B. Local Governments as Economic Actors
Though decentralization is characterized by the philosophy of “from the central
to local governments” and “from the government to the private sector,” in reality,
the most prominent feature is the central-to-local shift of funds in the government
sector. For example, in some resource-rich regencies, such as Kutai Kartanegara
Regency in East Kalimantan Province, local governments are initiating large-scale
development projects on their own. Some local governments have also established
and operate airline companies.1 On the surface at least, more noticeable than the
increasing importance of private sector economic actors in regional economies fol-
lowing decentralization is the desire for active involvement in economic activities
by local governments that benefit from the transfer of funds from the central gov-
ernment.
Following decentralization, there have been an increasing number of cases where
local governments have tried to assume state-owned assets in the regions and to
take over the operations of state enterprises. Most notable have been demands for
the transfer of control from the central to local governments of public utilities such
as airports and ports. Local governments have condemned the state enterprises
managing these facilities for their opaque management and imposition of unsound
surcharges. There have also been cases where local governments have proposed to
take over the management of airports and ports to keep them in full operation, given
the concern that the planned integration and abolition of state enterprises managing
these airports and ports may lead to cutbacks in their functions or a decline in
services. In Banten Province, the provincial government began operating its own
port, claiming that the port management by the state was inefficient. This led to an
unusual situation where the state and the provincial government competed for port
1 Among local governments that have established airline companies are Nangroe Aceh Darussalam
Province, North Sumatra Province, Riau Province, South Sulawesi Province, Papua Province, and
Kutai Kartanegara Regency in East Kalimantan Province. The South Sulawesi provincial govern-
ment put up capital for Celebes Airlines, which flies short-distance routes within Sulawesi Island
and Sulawesi Airlines, which serves the eastern parts of Indonesia. The lack of transparency about
this investment from the provincial budget became a subject of discussion in the provincial assem-
bly. Sulawesi Airlines operates joint flights with the privately owned Kartika Airlines for Papua–
Jakarta and other routes. However, most of them failed to survive.
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operations.2 Jakarta is demanding control over state-owned assets in the province,
arguing that the central government should provide rewards to it for providing ser-
vices and shouldering costs as the country’s capital, and also argues that the trans-
fer is necessary for the sake of enhanced management efficiency.3 The central gov-
ernment is balking at the transfer of state assets, which it regards as vested interests,
and has adopted restrictions by enacting the central government regulation (peraturan
pemerintah: PP) regarding port and airport management.4 The ability of local gov-
ernments to manage these assets is also being called into serious question.
While local governments have come to the common recognition that the induc-
tion of investment is essential for regional economic development following decen-
tralization, they have also displayed a growing tendency to seek ways to make use
of assets held by state enterprises and foreign-owned companies operating in their
regions as sources of funding. Generally speaking, local governments, with an aware-
ness that they lack technology and knowledge to realize development potential
backed by rich resources, choose to invite “outsiders” to develop their regions, and
receive a share (compensation for the utilization of resources). In other words, local
governments adopt a wait-and-see approach in the belief that investment from out-
side will surely come to benefit from the rich resources they own. They also believe
that investing companies, who possess technology and capabilities that regions do
not have, are obliged to contribute to regional development and should pay third-
party donations as “development cooperation fees.” Even local governments in re-
source-rich regions that are already benefiting from the massive transfer of funds
from the central government under revenue-sharing arrangements are deeply inter-
ested in coming up with good reasons to solicit funds from companies that are
already operating in their regions.
These attitudes can be found in the frequent feuds between local governments
and foreign-owned companies. The conflict between the central government and
local governments over PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC), a foreign-owned coal devel-
opment concern located in East Kalimantan Province, has drawn the keenest atten-
tion in connection with decentralization. When KPC was established in 1982, it
took on a contract obligation to hand over an equity stake of 51% to the Indonesian
side by the end of 2001, ten years after the start of operations in 1992. However, as
a result of the financial crisis, differences emerged over the evaluation of the equity
shares to be sold between KPC and the Indonesian side, resulting in a delay in the
2 The Banten Province government created a local government enterprise called BUMD Banten
Pelabuhan Mandiri to compete against PT Pelindo, a state-run port management enterprise (Kompas,
October 29, 2002).
3 Media Indonesia, March 14, 15, and 18, 2003. There were also a large number of cases where the
municipality, newly separated from its original regency, demanded the takeover of regency assets
in it.
4 Central Government Regulation No. 69/2001 on Port Management, and Central Government Regu-
lation No. 70/2001 on Airport Management.
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stock sale. The Indonesian partners in the project included the governments of East
Kalimantan Province and East Kutai Regency along with the central government.
Ultimately, in July 2002, an agreement was worked out under which the central
government would buy 21% and the governments of East Kalimantan Province and
East Kutai Regency take a combined 30%, and both local governments established
local government enterprises to purchase the shares. However, the sell-off negotia-
tions hit a serious snag, as private companies behind the two local governments
persisted in calling for the acquisition of a 51% stake in KPC. In the end, in July
2003, the foreign interests decided to sell all the shares of KPC to the Indonesian
concern PT Bumi Resource and to withdraw from KPC. The incident sapped the
willingness of foreign companies to invest in Indonesia, and the two local govern-
ments involved failed to gain anything from their attempts to gain profits on the sale
of KPC shares and draw funds from certain private companies that stood behind
them. This provided a major lesson for both sides.
C. Management Problems at Regional Government Enterprises (BUMD)
Since the implementation of decentralization, regional government enterprises
(Badan Usaha Milik Daerah: BUMD) have drawn keen attention as major players
in regional economies and as means for increasing revenue from own sources of
local governments. However, despite high expectations, BUMDs came to be plagued
with inefficient management at a level similar to or greater than state enterprises
(Badan Usaha Milik Negara: BUMN). In fact, about 60–70% of the total of 1,600
BUMDs appear to be operating in the red.5 Discussions had been ongoing since the
mid-1980s on management efficiency and the privatization of BUMNs, but BUMDs
faced far less pressure and thus lost a chance to address their management issues.
The central government finally began to press local governments to improve man-
agement at local government enterprises in much the same way as it had done for
state enterprises. In March 2003, Minister of Interior Hari Sabarno unveiled a policy
to reorganize BUMDs into two groups: profit-oriented joint-stock companies
(perseroan terbatas: PT) and public-interest regional companies (perusahaan
daerah: PD).
As shown by recent statistics on BUMNs and BUMDs from the Central Board of
Statistics (BPS 2001, 2002), by industry, the losses of water supply companies
(perusahaan air minum: PAM) were by far the largest after 1999 (Table V). The
after-tax losses of the water supply sector amounted to Rp 552.1 billion in 2000.
5 Based on the remarks of Chairman Prabowo Sunirman of the Cooperation Board of Local Govern-
ment Enterprises in All Indonesia (Badan Kerjasama BUMD Seluruh Indonesia: BKS-BUMDSI).
The Board was inaugurated on June 23, 2003, and members of the caucus were appointed by the
Minister of Interior (Kompas, June 24, 2003). According to data of the Central Board of Statistics
(BPS 2002), as of 2000, 272 out of a total of 578 local government enterprises were operating in the
red.
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While other sectors were all in the black, BUMDs as a whole chalked up after-tax
losses of Rp 243 billion due to the huge loss in the water supply sector. The water
supply projects were carried out by local governments using foreign aid funds bor-
rowed from the central government. According to Lewis (2001), the terms for bor-
rowings by local governments were easy, possibly causing them to lose their will-
ingness to repay the funds to the state. By province, the Jakarta Special Capital
Province had the largest combined loss from BUMDs, with the figure reaching Rp
515.4 billion in 2000. This loss was offset by profits in other provinces of Java as
well as in South and East Kalimantan Provinces.
The balance of lending to BUMDs, which stood at Rp 32 billion at the end of
2002, jumped to Rp 2,370 billion in June 2003 (Rp 2,340 billion as of the end of
November 2003). The causes of this sharp rise in lending are not known, but im-
provements in management and the privatization of BUMDs, including in water
supply services, are likely to become important issues in the future.
D. The Quest by Regional Development Banks (BPD) to Become Commercial Banks
Regional development banks (BPD) are designed to be banks of local govern-
ments with capital put up by local governments (provinces and regencies/munici-
palities). The role of BPDs, as stipulated under the Act on Regional Development
Banks (Act No. 13/1962), is to finance investments in and the expansion and re-
newal of development projects undertaken by local governments or by joint ven-
tures between local governments and private sector companies. The 1998 revision
in the Banking Act defines BPDs as ordinary money-lending banks.
TABLE  V
PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES
Operating Revenue After-Tax Profit Rate of Return
(Rp Million) (Rp Million) (%)
(A) (B) (B/A)
1997 2000 1997 2000 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total 3,777,146 5,742,422 139,078 −242,974 3.7 −0.5 −23.5 −4.2
Agriculture 25,749 37,425 6,454 6,095 25.1 50.5 25.7 16.3
Mining 5,286 12,949 119 1,342 2.3 4.7 7.4 10.4
Manufacturing 86,071 101,806 445 1,755 0.5 1.6 5.3 1.7
Water supply 1,520,738 1,821,528 −17,017 −552,118 −1.1 −7.9 −29.3 −30.3
Construction 4,570 28,635 −1,404 1,070 −30.7 13.4 −3.8 3.7
Commerce/hotel 53,082 147,518 −3,973 6,534 −7.5 1.5 0.1 4.4
Telecommunications/
transportation 937 790 143 108 15.3 4.2 13.6 13.7
Financial 2,019,313 3,435,854 155,731 281,578 7.7 1.2 −24.6 8.2
Services 61,400 155,919 −1,420 10,663 −2.3 3.1 5.5 6.8
Sources: BPS (2001, 2002).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Lending by BPDs expanded continuously until the financial crisis, but declined
during the crisis from 1997 through 2000. Following the implementation of decen-
tralization in 2001, their lending increased substantially, soaring 45% in 2001 over
the preceding year. Apparently because of limitations on the quantitative expansion
due to the confinement of their lending activities to their respective provinces, the
ratio of nonperforming loans to total lending is lower than for other banks. Looking
at lending activities by BPDs (Table VI), consumer credit accounted for 70.4% of
total outstanding lending at the end of 2000 and 61.9% at the end of 2003, with
much lower ratios of lending for working capital or investment than state banks and
private sector banks. The ratio of lending by BPDs to total lending rose from 7.6%
at the end of 2000 to 10.7% at the end of 2003, topping the ratio for foreign bank
branches and joint venture banks.
TABLE  VI
LENDING BY BANKS
(%)
State Regional Private Foreign Banks, TotalBanks Dev. Banks Banks JV Banks
Working capital credits:
1999 16.6 2.8 43.6 37.1 100.0
2003 29.6 6.0 50.3 14.1 100.0
Investment credits:
1999 28.9 3.3 54.3 13.6 100.0
2003 34.2 5.2 57.6 3.0 100.0
Consumer credits:
1999 31.5 24.0 35.4 9.1 100.0
2003 26.8 22.6 44.1 6.5 100.0
State Regional Private Foreign Banks, TotalBanks Dev. Banks Banks JV Banks
1999:
Working capital credits 48.6 23.4 63.8 85.6 63.5
Investment credits 19.1 6.2 18.0 7.1 14.3
Consumer credits 32.3 70.4 18.2 7.3 22.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2003:
Working capital credits 51.8 28.9 52.3 74.7 51.8
Investment credits 1.8 9.2 21.8 5.8 18.8
Consumer credits 26.5 61.9 26.0 19.5 29.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Indonesia (various years).
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At present, most domestic BPDs are seeking to go beyond being institutions
owned by regional governments, to become ordinary banks and foreign exchange
banks that can raise capital through other means. In fact, there are already BPDs
that have raised funds by issuing bonds.6 Bank Jabar (the BPD of West Java Prov-
ince) ranks 19th among all banks in Indonesia in terms of assets (in the first half of
2003), while Bank Jatim (the BPD of East Java Province) and some others have
opened branches in Jakarta (Investor, no. 89, Nov. 5–18, 2003, pp. 28–29). While
BPDs are in a position to respond more effectively to the need for lending for re-
gional development projects, it also needs to be pointed out that there have been
frequent cases where funds have been lent to projects closely linked to the personal
interests of high local government officials. As cited among reform measures for
BUMDs, if BPDs convert themselves into ordinary banks and joint-stock compa-
nies, they will be less likely to become involved in cozy relations or corruption with
local governments, allowing them to make independent lending decisions and es-
tablish corporate governance. In doing so, they would probably be drawn into fierce
competition with state banks and private sector banks in the search for bigger shares
of the lending and deposit markets.
E. Private Sector Company Activities in Regions
Since the introduction of decentralization, regional cities have seen the emer-
gence of new businesses, such as small-scale restaurants and Internet-based ser-
vices. In addition, there are signs of robustness in the real estate business, including
the construction of shopping malls and combined residence-retail shops called “ruko
(rumah toko).” With the construction of shopping malls in regional cities, many
well-known stores in Jakarta and Java are branching out into regional cities, driving
some local markets or small-scale operators out of business through competition.
Imported luxury cars, which were once only seen in Jakarta or Surabaya, can now
be seen on the streets of regional cities, and there has been a Jakarta-like spending
boom among rich people in regions. On the other hand, no major changes have
taken place in rural areas, with the increasing likelihood, at least in the short run, of
the economic gap between cities and rural areas in regions growing wider.
In retrospect, the financial crisis has had a tremendous impact on the activities of
private sector companies in regions. As in the capital region, all across the country,
private enterprise groups engaged themselves in a variety of businesses using pub-
lic demand such as public works related to government development projects as a
launching pad. However, these corporate groups, though classified by the regions
as large companies, faced difficulty in raising funds in the aftermath of the crisis,
and were forced to reduce or liquidate their expanded businesses under the weight
6 Regional development banks (BPDs) whose bonds were being traded at the end of December 2003
include five banks in Jakarta, South Sumatra, West Java, East Java, and West Sumatra (Bank Nagari).
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of massive bad debts. This prompted a reversion to their core business operations,
while they waited for a general business recovery. Meanwhile, small- and medium-
sized companies in regions began to grow in the wake of the financial crisis, and
sound management helped them tide over the crisis without relying on governmen-
tal protection. These small businesses were seen as potential borrowers by banks,
which desperately needed to find fresh lending businesses to regain their footing.
Learning from their experiences in the crisis, banks tried to avoid the high risks
associated with lending large amounts to big borrowers, and became quite willing
to lend money to small businesses in their search for creditworthy small- and me-
dium-scale clients. Introducing the automatic screening of loan applications by small
businesses in regions and expanding loans with movables and business operations
themselves as collateral, banks went on an offensive in lending to those borrowers.
As described above, just as some small businesses in regions began to acquire
competitiveness through steady and sound management, decentralization brought
with it a massive shift of funds from the central government, giving rise in turn to
opportunities in the regions to obtain a variety of new rents. With the weight of
public works still high in regional economies, various actors with close ties to gov-
ernment officials and politicians competed for new rents that could be found in
markups of public works costs and corruption, raising concern that Indonesia’s
regions might return to the unsound business climate that prevailed before the
financial crisis. In the end, private sector companies in regions, including emerging
small businesses that began to become competitive through sound management,
were not provided with an overall environment by local government where private
sector investors could act relatively freely, but were instead pressured by them to
dole out “development cooperation fees” and to pay unreasonable rewards for “public
services,” or in some cases, were urged to form cozy relations with local govern-
ments to share rent-acquiring opportunities.
CONCLUSION: CAPACITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
How did actors such as local governments, local government enterprises, and pri-
vate sector companies react to the decentralization brought from the outside into
the regions? How did decentralization and the actors’ reactions to it affect the struc-
tures of regional economies? In this article we examined these issues in terms of the
quantitative and qualitative changes that may have occurred in regional economies.
Though our examination revealed some quantitative changes, qualitatively, there
have been few major changes in the behaviors of actors or regional economic ac-
tivities themselves, despite the transfer of powers and funds from the central to
local governments.
Fundamentally, decentralization encourages the widening, and not correction, of
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gaps between regions, because it acknowledges differences in the capacity of re-
gions and local governments as well as in the resources they possess, and respects
the initiatives and autonomy of respective regions and local governments. When
Indonesia decided to go ahead with decentralization, it must have prepared itself
for regional development strategies based on an economic dynamism that included
widening regional gaps. However, planned economy–like policy management by
local governments and the narrow-minded attitudes of local government bureau-
crats seeking rents from cozy ties with specified economic actors are indicative of
their intent to contain economic dynamism. There is a clear discrepancy between
the ideal of autonomous local governments envisioned under the new system and
the reality of the traditional behaviors of local governments.
The issue of whether decentralization is positive or negative for regional econo-
mies ultimately comes down to the capacity of local governments (and of local
government bureaucrats). Local government bureaucrats think they have full knowl-
edge of the new concept of administrative management introduced from foreign aid
organizations in the name of supporting decentralization. However, the support
extended so far for capacity building in local governments has tended to overem-
phasize the provision of knowledge and boosting academic qualifications. While
the so-called participatory development approach have now gained wide under-
standing, the dominant approach still remains one that stresses the process of put-
ting together and implementing development projects rather than policy planning
and management. This is largely because conventional development policies adopted
a project approach for all development programs. In addition, many local govern-
ments remain under the influence of “Indonesian socialism,” which originated from
the country’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta, and features such ideas as evil
merchants, exploitation, and the need to protect farmers. As a result, they still have
expectations for the inefficient cooperatives as important economic actors.
Local governments are actually having a difficult time ridding themselves of the
philosophical concepts of the socialist planned economy, where local governments
control economic activities as “watchdogs.” Private sector economic actors, for their
part, have also grown so accustomed to the old ways of seeking preferential treat-
ment in opportunities provided by local government bureaucrats and receiving as
many free rides as possible in their utilization of infrastructure. Local residents and
private economic actors with no chance of receiving such privileged treatment do
not think that they need public services that entail costly rewards.
What local governments must do for regional economies is not to control re-
gional economic activities as “watchdogs” but rather develop an “arena” where
private sector economic actors can compete autonomously in economic activities.
To that end, they must guarantee the actors fair entry opportunities, clarify the con-
tents and costs of necessary public services, and use ingenuity to secure self-sus-
tainable fair competition in the “arena.” To do so, local governments need to ac-
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quire the capacity to coordinate, guide, and enlighten economic actors, instead of
using the top-down, military-style way of giving orders and demanding obedience.
Expressing this capacity in a single word, it is equivalent to the term fasilitasi (“fa-
cilitation” in English), first brought in by foreign aid agencies but then adapted into
the Indonesian language.7 In other words, local governments are being called upon
to materialize this fasilitasi in practice. Given the strong continuing influence of the
“socialist planned economy” approach in the minds of local government officials,
however, there is concern that fasilitasi by local governments could easily be turned
into mobilisasi, which means mobilization.
It will not be easy to eliminate political intervention in regional economic activi-
ties, along with opportunities to obtain rents, or alter the attitudes of economic
actors such as local governments and private sector companies, including foreign-
owned concerns. Regional economies can expect to develop in a more autonomous
way if a variety of actors, including local governments, private sector companies,
and local residents, can rebuild their respective roles in regional economies and
their interrelationships, and, while working together to build an environment where
they can play their respective roles, adapt the system of decentralization to the
context of their own regions. Local governments must consider how to deftly fasilitasi
this string of processes and actually deliver. This problem entails the question of
how to administer the newly introduced system of decentralization, but at the same
time presents the incoming government to be inaugurated in 2004 with the task of
tirelessly searching for a new method of managing development policies that fits
the realities of regional economies, along with local governments, which must also
boost their own capacity to carry out this endeavor.
7 “Fasilitasi” is a new word coined during the period of the preparation for decentralization. It is now
commonly used by local governments across the country, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and local residents. Those who conduct fasilitasi are called fasilitator. The word fasilitasi is used,
for example, in “fasilitasi designed to facilitate dialogue between parties concerned with different
interests.” Just like fasilitasi, the term “stakeholder,” meaning interested parties, is also in wide use
in Indonesia.
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